Hassan Nasrallah Ashura Speeches: The thin line between Ethics and Identity by Saade, Bashir
This is an accepted/pre-ublication copy of: 
Saade, Bashir (forthcoming). “The Ashura Speeches of Hassan Nasrallah: The thin line 
between Ethics and Identity,” Middle East Journal. 
 
 
Hizbullah’s Ashura: The Ethics of Identity 
Bashir Saade 
 
 (٢٥٧هذه المناسبة، هذه الذكرى، هذه الحادثة )خطاب عاشوراء، 




At the beginning of the Islamic year, the first ten days of the month of Muharram, Shi’i 
Muslims commemorate the battle of Karbala. This battle that took place in 680 AD 
symbolizes for Shi’i Muslims the grave injustice done to the family of the prophet: during 
the battle, Imam Husayn, the son of the daughter of the prophet, Fatima, and Imam Ali, is 
killed along with his companions and family members.  Sunni Muslims although 
acknowledging that an injustice was committed in this battle, do not commemorate this 
event as a ritual, marking it as a founding moment for the existence of the Shi’i community. 
Ashura (from the word ‘āsher, ten, in Arabic) has been commemorated in many different 
ways across time, region, and historical contexts.  
 
The present work aims to shed light on one particular practice of Ashura, that of the 
Lebanese armed political movement1 Hizbullah. The reason for this is that Hizbullah’s 
Ashura can help us to understand better the relationship between the religious and the 
political and how these terms are constantly contested and reworked, a thematic grid so 
crucial to our understanding of contemporary Political Islam2. One of the highlights of 
Hizbullah’s Ashura commemorations are the speeches of its Secretary General Hassan 
Nasrallah, a speech that stands apart from the his many speeches given at other 
commemorations and events occuring throughout the year. 
 
Since the July 2006 war in Lebanon, that pitted Israel against  Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance, 
Nasrallah has been confined to appearing through a television screen when he delivers his 
                                                     
1 I am indebted to Adham Saouli for finding the best working label for Hizbullah. 
2 This paper is a sequel to my previous work on the ideology of the party, a cultural production that I 
have proposed to call the Politics of Remembrance, as I argued that Hizbullah’s understanding of its 
political environment and its capability to plan its political future has much less to do with a 
developed theoretically informed political worldview and much more to do with a process of writing 
history and relating to the past in several ways. See Bashir Saade, Hizbullah and the Politics of 
Remembrance: Writing the Lebanese Nation (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
speeches. Nasrallah began delivering speeches in the early 1980s when he was barely in his 
twenties and he has become famous throughout the region of the Middle East for his 
oratory skills, not just because of his charismatic persona but because of his concise, logical, 
and orderly structure, yet arguably because of the accuracy of his statements that distance 
him from the prevalent tradition in Arabic oration that privileges rhetoric at the expense of 
real, practical implications. Nasrallah’s speeches have already attracted the attention of 
scholars, and a few studies have been published, some by editors sympathetic to the party3, 
as well as a few written in the English language4. 
 
In this article, although I will study the structure of Nasrallah’s speeches I will also atttempt 
to account for, firstly, the various performative implications of these speeches, secondly, 
how they are a symptom of a more general ideological production of the party that is 
conducive to collective militant action, and third, how they are embedded in a more general 
ritualistic practice that both rearticulates and fuses together the religious and the political. 
For David Kertzer, rituals produce symbolic power that is not just a by-product of otherwise 
material or realist interests but are at the heart of what politics is, and the raison d’être of 
social movements and organizations5. The symbolic material dichotomy here is put into 
question. Ideology provides political vision without which action is severely impaired, if not 
impossible.  Yet it is not just ideology as a discursive production that is at stake but the 
states of consciousness it aims to foster, that renders collective action effective. Kertzer 
himself observed how Italian communists espoused Christian rituals such as Easter in order 
to produce social mobilization in a way that fused Christian and Communist “identity”6. 
 
In effect, Hizbullah’s Ashura, and specifically through the speeches of Nasrallah, aim at 
linking identity formation, namely a sense of belonging to a community, to the cultivation of 
certain set of skills or ethics. It addresses several audiences; the two most important of 
which are Hizbullah military and other party members, and the community of Hizbullah at 
large. Again, Ashura is interesting because within Islamic traditions it is a specifically Shi‘i 
commemoration, and although it fosters a sense of communitarian belonging, it also claims 
that the story and lessons of Imam al-Husayn should have universal resonance. As we shall 
see in this essay, identity formation is subservient to the cultivation of ethics and specific 
skills conducive to social and militant action. In the case of Hizbullah, a sense of belonging 
brings the community together in order to have a common objective in facing the enemy. 
 
Religion and politics here cease to be separate phenomena. This is not just to say that there 
is no “religious experience” that is isolated from other social and political phenomena, but 
that the very understanding of the former varies radically over time, so much so that it 
becomes questionable that there is such a thing as Religion that can ever be analytically 
                                                     
3 For example, see Ali Majed, Al Khitab `inda Al Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (Beirut: Dar Al maaref Al 
hikmiah, 2006). 
4 A collection of Nasrallah’s selected speeches has been published in English. See Nicholas Noe, Voice 
of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (London: Verso, 2007). For an interesting 
paper on the structure of the speech, see El Mustapha Lahlali, “Repetition and Ideology in 
Nasrallah’s Political Speeches,” Arab Media & Society 15 (2012).  
5 D.I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 
6 D.I. Kertzer, Comrades and Christians: Religion and Political Struggle in Communist Italy (Prospect 
Heights, Ill: Wareland Press, 1980). 
separated from other spheres of human life and experience. Since the rise of the secular 
state in the last two centuries, Religion has been studied in relation to politics or society 
rather as being suffused into these seemingly separate spheres of life7. These conceptual 
articulations are the product of ideological struggles in the West that lead to the “formation 
of the secular” as a separate set of sensitivities and epistemologies8. One key question to 
ask: is there  a concept of religion that exists at least theoretically outside institutional 
forces?9 I would not go as far as some to suggest that there is no such thing as religion10, 
mostly because social and political actors still identify to such conceptualizations, as well as 
the scholarly community, but the idea is to critically engage in this blurring of conceptual 
boundaries in order to understand how religion is constantly reinvented while embedded in 
the various other fields of the human condition. 
 
In effect, Hizbullah’s Ashura is not simply an attempt by a political organization to use a 
religious commemoration in order to advance certain political goals. Although it is definitely 
the case that the ritual has enabled the organization to mobilize people for a variety of 
purposes, Hizbullah’s Ashura signals an excellent example of the blurry boundaries of 
categories of the religious and the political. Nasrallah invites the listener in Ashura to 
engage in a “spiritual exercise” to use the expression of the French philosopher Pierre 
Hadot, “a practice that is destined to operate a radical change of the self”11. This process 
involves the cultivation of a knowledge that is conducive to a quality of living, a “savoir-
vivre”. It aims at producing the right state of consciousness, most specifically the skills of 
firmness and decisiveness – hazm and ‘azm are the words Nasrallah most often uses – in 
order for the various social actors involved to engage in certain actions. 
 
Yet, these exercises are not just “spiritual” in the modern sense of the term, as located in a 
transformation of the self, but involves first a process of relationality that moves the center 
of focus to the social sphere, and second one of authority which moves it again to the 
political sphere. The model elaborated by Michel Foucault (within his notion of “care of the 
self”)12, Hadot and others are interesting in reclaiming a lost tradition of linking philosophy 
or reason to a “spiritual” practice, but they still bring this connection back to a “care of the 
self” rather than observing more generally the fusion of the political and the religious, how 
questions of authority, power, social order, community formation and mobilization, etc 
belong to both conceptual realms. In fact, as soon as the self is not the locus of attention 
and relationality, the group or the political community is put into question: Foucault’s 
                                                     
7 Talal Asad’s thesis that Religion as belief and practices is historically Western one is instrumental in 
that regard. See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Power in Christianity and 
Islam (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
8 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2003). 
9 William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern 
Conflict (Oxford University Press, 2009), 60, 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385045.001.0001/acprof-
9780195385045. 
10 Timothy Fitzgerald, Religion and the Secular: Historical and Colonial Formations (London: 
Routledge, 2014). 
11 Pierre Hadot, Qu’est-Ce Que La Philosophie Antique? (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 271. 
12 Michel Foucault, Histoire de La Sexualité : Tome 3, Le Souci de Soi (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1984). 
overarching conceptual workaround is that of “power” as a multipurpose concept which 
explains these relations and the transformations undergone13. 
 
Before examining the details of my argument, I will outline how Ashura and the changes 
undergone in this ritual practice has been studied and understood in scholarly literature, 
then I will provide a slightly different take on the matter or at least highlight unexplored 
areas of Hizbullah’s Ashura. 
 
Ashura then & now 
 
One central argument on modern Ashura is from Lara Deeb, who claimed that the way 
modern Islamists re-articulated the ritual was to move its understanding from a 
“traditionalist” to a “modern” or “rationalist” epistemology. So for example, after 9 days of 
majlis ‘aza, mourning reunions where a qualified speaker retells, sings and at times sobs and 
cries the story of the killing of Husayn, his family, and his companions, traditional 
commemorations of the ritual culminate with processions on the tenth day with 
occasionally mourners spilling their own blood by wounding slightly the top of their head. 
Many twentieth century clerics, reject or strongly condemn such practices as  “backward” or 
simply not necessary to mourn the battle of Karbala. Deeb proposes the term 
“authenticated” to label the modernist approach because of the participants claims that 
they are looking for what they perceive to be a more “correct” version of practice, more 
attuned with an intellectual effort at making sense with the social and political purposes and 
‘reason’ behind the use of such practices and in line with the ruling of qualified 
contemporary legal experts. 
 
Yet the resilience of some inhabitants of the Lebanese town of Nabatieh to commemorate 
the tenth day by spilling blood has been a primary focus of scholars and the media at 
large14. The sensationalist and gruesome image of blood flowing has helped disseminate a 
contrast between this highly emotional and seemingly irrational practice and the more 
“rationalized” toned down version that has been sponsored by Hizbullah and Amal 
supporters which consists in just beating rhythmically a hand on one’s chest and walking in a 
very orderly and gender separated procession (whereas in the traditional model, women did 
not take part in the procession and men mostly walked without the overarching 
organizational clout that Hizbullah or other political parties provide for the ritual). 
 
Indeed, other scholars who tried to understand modern political Islam have theorized about 
a “secularized” political Islam, or a political Islam that is mostly concerned by “worldly” 
matters15. Notwithstanding the fact that there are many brands of political Islam with 
radically different political agendas, I am here just trying to address a seeming trend in 
contemporary scholarship to look at these movements through particular conceptual 
                                                     
13 For an interesting rebuttal to this porous notion of power, see Neil Brenner, “Foucault’s New 
Functionalism,” Theory and Society 23, no. 5 (1994): 679–709. 
14 For a recent study, see Norton, A. Ashura in Nabatieh, in Peter J. Chelkowski, ed., Eternal 
Performance: Taziyah and Other Shiite Rituals (Greenford: Seagull, 2010). 
15 M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford university press, 2003). 
binaries that can be informative to a certain extent but need to be transcended. Deeb’s 
analysis is pertinent and draws from her fieldwork with Hizbullah supporters and 
sympathizers who voice their relation with Islam and the practice of the ritual in such a way. 
But it is important to reflect on this particular use of term. What is being meant by 
“rational” as opposed to “emotional” or “modern” as opposed to “traditional”? To use Edith 
Szanto’s formulation: “this binary… simultaneously depoliticizes salvation and desacralizes 
revolution”16. And while I agree with Szanto when she says that there is a need for an 
“analytic focus on affect, rather than political effectiveness”17, I would even argue than a 
focus on affect feeds into political effectiveness and broadens our understanding of the 
political in the way reason and emotion are inextricably entangled. 
 
Deeb acknowledges that Hizbullah is different from the more extreme authentication wave 
that is expressed by Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah a notorious Iraqi Lebanese cleric who 
becomes one of the main source of emulation for Shi‘i Muslims18 In this vein, Hizbullah 
supporters critique Fadlallah of “overintellectualizing”?19 For Deeb, in the case of Hizbullah, 
“[t]he energy and emotive power located in the commemoration were redirected and 
focused onto a shared set of goals”20. While this is certainly pertinent, I would like to 
explore more this link between “energy and emotive power” with a “redirected and 
focused... shared set of goals”. My overarching purpose here is to question whether the 
emotion/reason binary is analyticaly useful. Granted that supporters use it but is it to be 
taken as self-explanatory? Also, what is the relation between this conceptual binary and the 
other one of religion and politics? 
 
It is true that there has been a radical change in the way the Ashura ritual has been 
practiced, and the literature on the subject traces it throughout the twentieth century. But 
can we then use these terms in turn as categories of analysis? Clearly, what is meant by 
these terms vary across historical, social and political contexts, including how these terms 
are used in academia, in great part due to a modern epistemology reaching out from the 
Age of Enlightenment philosophers to the rise of the social sciences that has favored other 
binaries of the same sort, such as religion and secularism, object and subject, theory vs 
reality etc.21 In brief, there is something quite emotional about this invocation of reason and 
something rational about how emotions are deployed. And in effect, when scrutinizing 
Nasrallah’s speech, and this seems to be the function of political speeches par excellence, 
this reasoning that takes place within an emotional state of being is key to understanding 
the Husayni position, or mawqef.  
                                                     
16 Edith Szanto, “Beyond the Karbala Paradigm: Rethinking Revolution and Redemption in Twelver 
Shi’a Mourning Rituals,” Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 6, no. 1 (2013): 78. 
17 Ibid., 79. 
18 L. Deeb, “Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice,” Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25, no. 1 (2005): 130. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 131. 
21 For an insightful critique of this conceptual binary in the social sciences, see Andrew Sayer, Why 
Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life (Cambridge, UK ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). And for the link between modernity as an era with its specific 
epistemology and the theory reality duality see T. Mitchell, “The Stage of Modernity,” in Questions 
of Modernity (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 1–34. 
 
Indeed, although Nasrallah at one level articulates a very “worldly” dimension of Ashura 
through his party’s understanding of military action for example, it is also connected to a 
much more important “other worldly” purpose. If anything, it is the confrontation of death 
in the battlefield, or in the experience of occupation that forced a rethinking of other-
worldly concerns. While it is possible to follow what some cynics have asserted that 
Hizbullah emulating the actions of Husayn in Karbala and cultivating a connection with and 
love of the afterlife has been instrumental for very worldly concerns of recruiting and 
conducting successful military operations, it is also possible to view this culture as 
inculcating a specific way of living-in-this-world by meditating on a possible other life. 
 
The other focus of the literature on Ashura, is how the commemoration of the ritual has 
moved from being quietist to politically active, militant, or even “revolutionary”. While it is  
true that Hizbullah, and a few preceding political movements such as Amal – even the 
Lebanese Communist Party for that matter22 - have turned Ashura into a platform to 
organize demonstrations, and political rallies, little exploration has been done to 
understand how these terms clarify the importance of religious practice in relation to 
organizational building and social change. Indeed, Ashura has always been a “rallying” ritual 
in the sense of being  paradigmatic to reaffirming community belonging and cohesion, a 
process which in itself irremediably involves political questions23. Although the rupture is 
well spotted, albeit voiced by the protagonists themselves, there was a tendency to forget 
about how much this new “politicized” Ashura is not only hugely indebted to the quietist or 
traditional one, but actually builds on the same techniques, as will be seen in the below, 
while producing small innovations. In effect, I argue that there is a need to take the 
modernist Ashura more seriously as a re-articulation of the religious in changing contexts.  
 
Ultimately, there is a need to understand politics as envisioned through a the cultivation of 
a consciousness of history as an intimate daily relation with space and time. These are at the 
heart of what could be labeled as, for lack of a better term, new religiosities, or in this case 
new “spiritual” articulations. By spiritual, I would propose the conceptual shortcut of “state 
of consciousness” in the Marxist tradition, which involves an acute awareness of one’s place 
in a community and the material conditions that shapes it, a link that seems to have been 
severed in Foucault’s later work on sexuality and cultivations of the self. New religiosities 
are products of profound social and political changes. The reworking of the ritual to suit new 
historical realities, in which Shi‘i clerics from Iran, Iraq and Lebanon found themselves 
drawn to resort to political action. The gradual social change brought about the creation of 
states in the region, upsetting the cozy relationship between a rich landowning class and a 
relatively isolated and protected clerical establishment24. 
 
 
                                                     
22 Rula Jurdi Abisaab and Malek Abisaab, The Shi’ites of Lebanon: Modernism, Communism, and 
Hizbullah’s Islamists (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2014). 
23 See for example, the letters of South of Lebanon prominent cleric Abd al-Husayn Sharafeddin who 
opposed French colonial power in the turn of the tweentieth century and was in favor of a larger 
Arab state. His passages on Ashura are symptomatic of this. 
24 Ibid,. 
Hizbullah’s Ashura, a few remarks 
 
Just like all other prominent clerics related to Hizbullah, Nasrallah has given a speech during 
the Ashura ritual ever since the formation of the party. Political speeches during Ashura are 
an innovation given that the typical way of gathering during commemorations were the 
majlis ‘aza in which qualified storytellers remembered in great minute details the battle of 
Karbala. As Deeb notes, an authenticated majlis would involve “longer sermon and more 
[emotionally] restrained narration of the events of Karbala”, mostly used to “teach religious, 
social, and political lessons”25. An extension to this would be the sermon-like speeches 
which blends religious motifs with political analyses and ethical lessons. It sounds more like 
a conference lecture or seminar rather than an ‘artistic’ performance, for lack of a better 
term. While Ashura has often been used as a platform to express certain community 
concerns, the political speech during Hizbullah’s Ashura has become a cornerstone of the 
commemoration and due to the latter’s sophisticated organizational capacity it has pushed 
the structuring of commemorations to unprecedented levels. 
 
It is important to note that Hizbullah’s Ashura in structure does not differ from regular 
commemorations that take place in a husayniya, which is a simple room usually adjacent to 
a mosque used for all kinds of Shi‘i gatherings, except for its impressively disciplined and 
orderly execution. One of the main locations where Hizbullah supporters commemorate 
Ashura is Mujama‘ al Shuhadā, which is a very large hall that basically works as a husayniya 
and from which most televised appearances take place on Hizbullah’s related TV channel, Al 
Manar. While husayniyas are not organically or officially controlled by political parties like 
Hizbullah or Amal, one interesting innovation in Hizbullah’s Ashura is the setting of an 
overarching slogan that the party would disseminate amongst those locations that would 
inform the majalis. The slogan is usually taken from Husayn or other Imams sayings. For 
example one recurring slogan is the now famous hayhāt minna al-zulla, which literally 
translates as “away from us oppression” a sentence known to have been uttered by Imam 
Husayn after gathering his supporters ahead of the Karbala battle. In effect, Amal has also 
been setting a slogan too and some clashes have occurred such as the present year (2016) 
where Hizbullah had chosen a slogan that was used by Amal the previous year (nufūsun 
abiyyatun) and after intense negotiations opted to settle for sabrun wa nasrun26. 
 
The slogan novelty is I think crucial not just in understanding how the ritual has become 
organized by an institution, but also as a prelude to the mawqef husayni (The Husayni stand) 
for Ashura on a particular year that Nasrallah would so eloquently and dramatically map out 
on the tenth day. The mawqef exemplifies how both reason and emotions are blurred in its 
deployment. This mawqef, in emulating Husayn’s decision to fight and be martyred in 
Karbala is supposed to help distinguish what is right from what is wrong, al haq minal batel. 
At the risk of simplifying here, Husayn’s martyrdom is but a living example of this distinction. 
And every successive commemoration of the ritual, year after year, is the practice of 
rendering conscious this distinction but mapping it in current social, moral, political, etc., 
pressing issues. 
 
                                                     
25 Deeb, “Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice,” 126. 
26 Anonymous Ashura participant, Interview with the author, Sept 2016. 
On the tenth day, when the procession takes place, Hizbullah and its scouts, kashāfat al 
mahdi, deploy an impressive and colorful array of men and women brandishing flags of the 
party or with Ashura slogans, to the extent that the main entrance roads of the Southern 
Suburbs of Beirut are closed during the procession. These processions are simultaneously 
happening in the rest of the country wherever Hizbullah has a political presence. During the 
first nine days, a typical Ashura day, while people listen to the above majlis, they also listen 
to nadbiyāt or latmiyāt which consist of poems and chants to the Imam Husayn and, 
typically in those recordings, the sound of a rhythmic beat, supposed to mimic the beating 
of a hand on one’s heart, and which is supposed to be done as a group. While in family 
houses, people would just listen to the nadbiyāt, Hizbullah’s organized Ashura, which 
happens in the Husayniyya or in the mujama’ al shuhada in Dahyeh, can be broadcasted live 
on TV. So that a typical Hizbullah managed Ashura involves speeches from prominent 
members in the party, including Nasrallah almost every other day, a majlis, and then 
nadbiyāt. 
 
Notably enough, because speeches or sometimes lectures are distinct from the majlis and 
do involve a blend of social, political and religious discussions drawn from the battle of 
Karbala, the prophet’s legacy and that of the Imams especially al-Husayn, the majlis, which 
has specific qualified people to conduct it, reverts to being solely focused on raw storytelling 
to move people to cry. In the latter case, the stories of the Karbala event are so detailed 
that some have qualified certain “readers” (qāre’) of not being credible, if not boring27.  In 
effect, some of Hizbullah’s sponsored Ashura seem to be considered slightly less ‘rational’ or 
less ‘making sense’ for a crowd in quest of ‘authentication’ as a source of emotional stimuli. 
Of course people should not be thought of as two distinct groups but rather as individually 
different in sensitivities. 
 
In the midst of this, Nasrallah’s Ashura speeches are part and parcel of Hizbullah’s Ashura. It 
should be understood as one part of the overall framework and the fact that it is followed 
by a majlis and then by the more “physical” interaction of the nadbiyāt has, intended or not, 
the consequence of privileging a more classical majlis. The speech fuses reasoning and 
affect in a powerful mix. The majlis comes to crystallize what has started in the speech, and 
these emotions are put to communal action during the nadbiyāt. 
 
 
The Ashura speech of Hassan Nasrallah 
 
Nasrallah typically speaks on the third, seventh, ninth and tenth days of Ashura. These 
speeches are slightly different from his usual political ones in content but similar in structure 
as they are still argumentative lectures with key points usually announced at the beginning. 
The difference only resides on the choice of theme which involves Islamic ethics and 
commentaries on stories and events that happened mostly around the Karbala incident but 
also other prophet related events. Especially in the first three days, the tone remains mostly 
calm, Nasrallah has a clear outline with a core set of concepts he wants to discuss. A 
favorite, and a recurrent theme is asceticism (zuhd), which, if properly practiced, leads to a 
                                                     
27 This is drawn from discussions with anonymous participants in Ashura commemorations. 
consciousness and belief of the afterlife (imān fi al-ākhira) and a capacity to detach from 
this worldly one (dunya). There is a great description of what dunya and its illusory 
privileges are, all the things one fights for in life such as money, family, work ambitions, 
power etc. 
 
For Nasrallah these are all linked to the satisfaction of desires and instincts that we all have, 
and yet these are the same individually or collectively centered desires and instincts that 
lead people to “steal, cheat, do injustice, oppress, and enslave” (kitāb ‘āshūrā’, 225). This is 
a great example of the direct link Nasrallah relentlessly makes between self-realization and 
the possibility of social justice, an instance of the link between the religious and the political 
here, between individual, collectivity, and virtuous community. 
 
Nasrallah is keen on repetitively pointing out that detachment from this life, which usually 
involves a constant meditation on death, does not mean inaction in society. Rather, 
detachment leads to a certain awareness that informs the actions we undertake. These 
actions are not solely aimed at preparing one to face the possibility of death, but to provide 
a method to reach happiness in this life. Thus it is clear that for Nasrallah the adept, 
whoever he/she is, cultivates a state of being-in-action in the present through this reflection 
on death and the afterlife. To illustrate for Nasrallah, “the person (insān) who thinks of 
death, he is the one who possesses an open heart to life (dunya) and afterlife (ākhira) on 
the mulk and malakūt and all that exists (al wujūd)” (khitāb āshūrā, 91). And yet Nasrallahs 
discredits senseless death, for example, in an early speech, he was commenting on suicide 
attack operations in the following manner: “not every one who kills himself thinks of death 
in this way” (Ibid,.). Strikingly, this is very much echoed almost ten years later, in Nasrallah’s 
assessment of “takfiri” movements, Sunni radical organizations, engaging in such attacks. 
 
The relationship between asceticism, detachment from worldly affairs and meditation on 
death is a constant in all spiritual practices across time and place. The ethical work Nasrallah 
proposes in his various speeches throughout the years all feed into this same logic. In this 
sense, what Nasrallah develops here is not new to what we call a religious tradition. Yet it is 
the particular way in which “reason” is used through the medium of the speech and how it 
produces a certain set of sensitivities and dispositions in an audience that is at stake here. In 
line with what has been argued so far, Nasrallah works on changing a specific state of 
consciousness, that is spiritual (in the sense of “of the spirit”) and reaching through reason 
to untapped affects that are conducive to different forms of political? actions. 
 
Although the many passages devoted to zuhd and meditation on death and afterlife in 
Nasrallah’s Ashura speeches (that may have well triggered the media campaign that dubbed 
such ideological production a “culture of death” by Hizbullah’s political opponent in 
Lebanon), are aimed at disciplining everyday life, they also feed into informing 
understanding of jihād and shahāda. This remembrance where meditation on death brings 
actual triumph in this life is central to the resistance as a military project; “we don’t 
remember aba ‘abdellah al-husayn ‘alayhi-s-salām and Karbala only when martyrs of the 
Resistance fall, we also remember him when we take over hills and plant our weapons in the 
highest peaks” (khitāb āshūrā, 257). Countless times, Nasrallah describes every detail of the 
experience of the combatant through a direct link to a remembrance act, to actions 
undertaken by Imam Husayn or others like him that were present during at the battle of 
Karbala. 
 
Leadership and the hierarchy of knowledge 
 
A recurrent theme in Nasrallah’s Ashura speeches is the importance of the leader, whose 
authority rests solely on a type of knowledge that only he possesses. For Nasrallah, people 
have different types of knowledge according to the skills they develop due to their position 
in the community. Knowledge is here squarely equated with skills echoing with Aristotelian 
and Platonic Greek philosophical articulations. Political knowledge/skill is not given to 
“everyone from this community”. It is worth pausing here to consider the relationship 
between knowledge and skills. For Nasrallah, knowledge-come-skills involves “the 
realization of a problem or to look into a political issue” (khitāb ashurā’, 109). This notion of 
political knowledge while highly polyvalent leads to an understanding of leadership that 
spreads across a hierarchical understanding of community. The Leader can refer to the wāli, 
and the latter can be the Imam, such Husayn himself, and it can be the now famous wāli al-
faqīh. Yet this political knowledge relates to the cultivation of ethics mentioned above and 
thus involves not just some intellectual analysis but a specific virtuous condition or state of 
consciousness that depends on the contexts in which each social actor is embedded. 
 
The story goes as follows. Husayn during his lifetime was wāli al amr. He was succeeded by 
his son ‘Ali, known as zayn al ‘abideen (the ornament of the worshippers) as he was known 
for his piety. In turn the latter was succeeded by his son, and so on until one reaches the 
twelfth descendant of the daughter of the prophet, Imam al-Mahdi who disappears 
(ghayba) and is expected to return. Each one of these imams were walis in their own time. 
But after the disappearance of Imam al Mahdi, what gradually becomes the Shi‘i tradition is 
split over the question of the proper wāliʼ,  where the classical position has been that in the 
absence al-Mahdi, there is no wāli and therefore the twelver Shi‘i community is mostly 
“quietist”. With Khomeini’s juridical innovation that a jurist could assume the position of 
Wali al faqih (literally: the rulership of the Jurist), and which is now held by Ali Khamenei, for 
Shi‘i individuals and groups who accept this rule, Khamenei is considered wāli al amr at least 
until the return of Imam al-Mahdi. 
 
This doctrine no matter how it is lived or practiced, at the very least creates a clear 
understanding of lines of authority, and thus of politics. In Nasrallah’s speeches, this 
doctrine permits a constant timeless connection between Imam Husayn as an authoritative 
figure and the various authoritative figures today, whether it is Khamenei, or even Nasrallah 
himself. For example, the 2014 slogan, for Ashura was labayk (literally translated as at your 
command) which, as I said, like all these slogans are drawn from ahl al-bayt, the family of 
the Prophet hadith literature. While labayka ya husayn is a clear reference to a rallying cry 
to husayn, crowds have always cheered Nasrallah in the same way, scanding labayka ya 
nasrullāh whenever he appears to give a speech. 
 
Husayn as wāli al amr just like Imam al Mahdi is also called baqiyatullāh (khitāb ‘āshūrā’, 
111) which literally translates as “rest of God”, signaling the central importance of the 
imams in the Shi‘i tradition. For Nasrallah, it is this single instance that makes the killing of 
Husayn a central event in the formation of the prophet or Islamic legacy and not just an 
allegory for understanding more general issues of social justice. But away from inspecting 
the intentional extensions of these beliefs, crucial here is the time continuum that links 
communities in a vertical relationship from past, present, to future around a form of 
knowledge that remains hidden. It is in the interstices of ghayb (the hidden), of the mystery 
of the form of knowledge imam have that one witnesses another instance of politics and 
religion fusing, through the meeting ‘aql and qalb.  
 
Indeed, another important dimension of this hierarchy of knowledge is the notion of ‘ālam 
al ghayb, the unseen world. Ghayb is not just the notion that there are things we don’t 
know or that one’s spiritual ranking determines the type of knowledge that is manifest to 
him. Ghayb also presupposes a specific notion of time. As Nasrallah argues, although we 
don’t know ghayb, it is still transmitted in one way or another, as if woven into acts of 
reporting and of narrating. And where shahāda is testifying, ghayb begins. Shahāda, the act 
of testifying of a cause, a legacy, or a (noble) rationale of action and which is the lot of 
martyrs can be grasped by the common mortals, where as ghayba is built-in knowledge in 
sheer prophetic revelation or in the living embodiment of imams. Indeed only prophets 
bring clarity and meaning to what is otherwise hidden. Humans can only tell the story of 
these actions that were first rendered clear by prophets or imams, what Nasrallah calls “al 
ikhbār bel ghayb… mā lā nashhaduhu, mā lā nuhītu bihi”, telling about the hidden, what we 
haven’t witnessed, what we did not surround ourselves with (Nasrallah Ashura speech, 10th 
day, 2006). 
 
This is important for the present purpose because of this interplay between reason and 
emotions that is manifest in imagining the presence of ghayb, understanding prophecies 
and trusting the messenger, especially the last imam, Mahdi, who is always there but in a 
parallel dimension and is expected to return. Nasrallah mentions that ghayb is related to the 
notion of wahi, intuition, which is an attribute of prophecy. This type of knowledge almost 
springs from nowhere from within if not from the heart. To this effect Nasrallah quotes a 
few Ayas of surat al najm, innahu wahyun yuha, and ma kazzaba-l-fouad mā yara) (Ibid.). In 
effect, in the Qur’anic tradition the siege of reason or ‘aql is the heart (qalb, or fuād). Here 
reason is once more, not just intrumental intellectual reason, but self-encompassingly and 
intuitively emotionally laden. 
 
 
The power of story-telling and the narrative form 
 
More generally, Nasrallah’s Ashura speeches are built to bring about a certain form of 
knowledge that cannot be deduced just from discursive articulations even if it is suggested 
through speech form. But Nasrallah can merely suggest that this form of knowledge exists. 
There are two consequences to this phenomenon. First because not every form of 
knowledge from events and actions can be fully grasped, storytelling is the best medium to 
remember an event as it carries some built-in knowledge. The motives behind Husayn’s 
decision to go to Karbala and die as a martyr is not fully understandable to the common 
mortal (khitāb āshūra, 140),  The story is a reservoir of layers of lessons that resonate in 
different ways according to the various states of consciousness cultivated. Second, this 
narrative aspect of knowledge invites the listener to trust and rally to a specific cause while 
partly understanding the reasons behind action and partly trusting the motives of 
respectable actors such as Imams, leaders, etc.  
 
In Nasrallah speeches, argumentation suffuses storytelling in order to make a powerful link 
between affect and rationales of action. Indeed, the myriad of events taking place before, 
during and after the battle of Karbala fosters a consciousness of history that does not just 
occupies the past but very much the present and anticipates the always arriving future. 
Hizbullah’s politics of remembrance involves an interplay of temporalities where history has 
already been written and where the past is always instantiated. Ghayb is a crucial notion 
here as through the actions of prophets and imams this hidden knowledge simply hangs 
between past, present and future (Ibid.). 
 
Although one cannot understand all the factors that led Husayn to leave Mecca and die 
resisting Yazid’s forces in Karbala, for Nasrallah, it was not just the fight against oppression 
or for social justice that was at stake but the very legacy of the prophet, the very 
preservation of Islam as a tradition of practices. The link here between identity and ethics is 
here at its best. In this vein, those who stood by al-Husayn were not just “followers”, but 
were fully “conscious” (wā‘yin) of what they were doing, and they fought for long years 
alongside his father, Ali (Ibid., 175). This is a clear allusion to the rationale that drives todays 
fighters to join the Islamic Resistance. The parallel between the Husayni movement and the 
Islamic Resistance is here again at play and Nasrallah constantly shifts between both 
temporalities at various moments of his speech. Same for Islamic resistance fighters who 
are fighting the Israeli, to liberating a territory because preserving a specific legacy that 
transcends the protection of land but involves the upholding of a whole set of values. 
 
 
Khurūj and the physicality of action 
 
The relation between upholding Islamic values and esoteric knowledge is manifested by a 
meditation on the reasons of Husayn’s decision to go to Karbala and die as a martyr. This 
action is usually referred to as the “going out” of Husayn or khurūj al-husayn. If Husayn’s 
hijra was aimed at protecting Islamic values and the legacy of the prophet (Ibid., 193), 
Nasrallah often repeats that it is not entirely clear for human cognition why he decides to 
leave the comfort of Mecca where he was performing Hajj and go to Karbala.  Nasrallah’s 
speeches stress time and time again this action of going by not just mentioning its story but 
by carefully dissecting new aspects of the story constantly emerging according to the 
context and argumentation, and by trying to extirpate different types of wisdom from it. 
This is the only way to grasp the ever vanishing nature of “identity”. Nasrallah, time and 
time again links this question “What is the wisdom of khuruj al-husayn” (Ibid., 128) to an 
answer: “In this [Husayn’s] stand, the Islamic Resistance is like Karbala” (Ibid., 132). It is not 
just a set of ethics that is learned from Husayn’s decision to face the oppressor, to not 
prioritize idle piety (for example performing the hajj) and stand by what social or political 
justice means in different historical contexts, but also what is at stake here is the physicality 
of going out, which is what the 10th day procession of the ritual is partly about. 
 
The physical nature of the khurūj in Nasrallah’s speech is of paramount importance. The 
audience is constantly called to relive the conditions of travel of Husayn, and then his 
encirclement in Karbala, the thirst he experienced in the middle of the desert, and so on. 
The wisdom here is suffused in the experience of being ready to leave, as if to take arms or 
at least in some social or political action that shakes us from the daily routine. It is in sense 
the type of states of consciousness and mode of action that Nasrallah wants to cultivate are 
as much military as they are religious, so much so that a clear distinction of these is useless, 
or at least analytically poor. A very recurring and important theme, the courage of the 
Husayn, is mostly understood through his stubborn stand despite all the odds. This was 
important because as Husayn knew fully well that he was going to die, what triumphed is 
the preservation of the Islamic tradition. The “believer’s” resistance of Hizbullah works in 
the same way. It understands the magnitude of the task in the real world, but faith comes 
from the rational certitude that the notion of resistance will be preserved and eventually 
tribumph against the Israeli enemy. The interplay of trusting, rallying to the cause of Husayn 
or resistance, and yet being fully conscious of the consequence of one’s action even if this 
involved dying, is at its best here.  
 
In effect, the ultimate test, the impetus for action is triggered by Nasrallah’s haunting 
question: “Are we going to leave husayn alone?” (Ashura 2013, 13-11-2013, day 9). The 
climax of several days of Ashura is reached on the 9th day when Nasrallah pushes his 
audience to choose this path that he gradually constructed through discussions of history, 
ethical principles upheld and political analyses, but boiling it down to a simple form of 
human allegiance. In effect, the highly analytical style of Nasrallah has charged an emotional 
rallying to the cause. The crowd becomes “the supporters of Husayn, ansār al-husayn” 
(Ashura 2013 day 10, 14-11-2013) and they are constantly interpellated with these terms all 
throughout the speeches. The rallying cry to Husayn as a impetus for community cohesion 
ties into another strong trigger of this, which a clear sense of leaderhip. To most of these 
heightened moments in Nasrallah’s speeches, the crowd cheers: “labayka ya Husayn, 
labayka ya Nasrullah”, at your command oh Husayn, at your command Nasrallah (Ashura 
2013, 10th day). Lastly, the physicality of the images Nasrallah sometimes uses are striking: 
“The one who backs down is like the one who leaves the Husayn in the middle of the night 
(Ashura 2015, 9th day). Or the saying of Zuhair Bin Yaqin, one of Husayn’s companion when 
the latter tells his followers to abandon him because there is no escape from death, Zuhair 
answer, “If I wanted to be killed, then burnt, then [my ashes] spread into the air, even if 
they do this one thousand times, I won’t leave you oh Husayn”28. 
 
 
The mawqef and the clarity of action 
 
The rallying cry, scanded time and time again is substantiated by what could well be the 
most important purpose of Hizbullah’s Ashura. On the 9th day, Nasrallah usually opens up 
with the objective of hasm al mawqef, determining the stand where “we distinguish our line 
(khattuna), our path (tarīquna), our camp (mu‘askarina)” (khitāb ‘āshūrā’, 95). This is the 
culmination of the Ashura ritual. The majāles, nadbiyāt, the listening to sermons and 
speeches of the preceding nine days all feed into giving clarity to the mawqef. The latter has 
already been insinuated by the overarching annual slogan. Even more so, Nasrallah’s speech 
                                                     
28 There are many versions to this hadith depending on the various Shi‘i sources, but this is the one 
Nasrallah always uses. It is also attributed to other companions such as Sa‘īd Bin ‘Abdallah al Najafi. 
on the 9th day elaborates the “reasoning” behind the mawqef. But the 10th day, shortly 
before the public “outdoor” procession starts, Nasrallah reiterates the Mawqef in a briefer 
fashion to remind the listeners of last night’s speech. 
 
“On this night, we need to make a pact with al-Husayn, and vow allegiance to him” (khitāb 
‘āshūrā’, p.94). This declaration of utmost fidelity is not just intellectual; it involves a holistic 
disposition to act as a community in sharply demarcating right from wrong. And right is 
illustrated by those who “went out” like Husayn, and rallied to his cause. The cause here is 
not only understood theoretically, say Israeli or the US is an oppressor because of a general 
theory of oppression, but also because it fits a possible story which operationalizes it. The 
narrative property of the story renders manifest al haq. The act of wanting to rally to the 
cause of al-Husayn, understanding his plight and the righteousness of his cause, helps 
understand the cause of the Islamic Resistance as it keeps both, and other struggles 
throughout history, contextual rather than involving absolute and abstract definitions of 
what is oppression. 
 
Indeed, all the argumentative and narrative elements I have discussed so far feeds into the 
clarity of the mawqef. It was the relentless studying of khurūj al husayn that led to this 
mawqef. This is not just a rational decision (as we understand reason) but a heightened 
state of consciousness that involved argumentation, meditation, tapping into various 
emotions, the cultivation of all types of ethics such as humility, courage, trust, etc. It is also 
the moment when an intellectual inquiry turns into an embodied action. The binary of right 
and wrong, of with or against Husayn, of accepting or dismissing, gradually intensifies as 
Nasrallah draws a shrewd political analysis of the contemporary condition while punctuating 
with sayings of Husayn or his son Ali. It is then only understandable that Nasrallah’s speech 
is usually followed by collective latmiyāt that acts as an extention to the emotional outburst 
of the speech. 
 
The last three years and the thin line between ethics and identity 
 
What has been discussed in the preceding runs across more than a decade of Ashura 
ceremonies. I have looked at Nasrallah speeches from the mid 1990s until today. While 
there is a clear constancy in the structure of Nasrallah’s speech and the development of the 
Ashura ritual when managed by Hizbullah, the last three years, especially since Hizbullah’s 
military intervention in Syria, has seen a notable change in tone as the main enemy fought 
in Syria were the various radical sunni militant organizations present there. The shift from 
the Israeli to the Takfiri involves significant implications. Of course, Nasrallah is keen to 
point out that Israel remains the primary enemy and beyond that the United states and its 
various proxies in the Middle East. In fact his mawqef of the last three years provides for a 
clear link between these various political actors down to Takfiri organizations. Yet the rise of 
this new enemy transforms the relation between ethics and identity that I have outlined so 
far. For one thing, Israelis never targeted Shi‘ism per se while Takfiris do. 
 
I have shown that in his speeches and through the Ashura ritual as a whole, Nasrallah 
develops a notion of identity that is conducive to ethical practices namely that of building a 
strong, united community rallied around a common project. Strong identity involves here 
not just effective resistance but also the cultivation of ethics of brotherly relations which in 
turn feeds into a collective self-assurance that is open to other groups in Lebanon and 
beyond29. One way this sense of belonging to a community that preserves a long-held 
tradition was nurtured, at least in these speeches, was through utmost loyalty. In the 1990s 
the enemy was not just the Israeli army but those who could weaken and fragment the 
community from within, such as collaborators. Echoing this concern throughout the 1990s 
Nasrallah comes back to this through the Ashura speeches by stressing the fact that Husayn 
was not killed in Syria where he was not followed to start with but in Iraq, by those who had 
pledged alleigance to his father. Those who killed Husayn in Karbala were from Kufa, the 
land who were mostly sympathetic to the family of the prophet, “they knew the haq”. 
Nasrallah is explicit in this, “they were friends of his father and friends of his brothers, 
people in his army” (khitāb ‘āshūrā’, 17). 
 
In the later fight against the “takfiri” movements, Nasrallah will reiterate this quest, but in 
this case, in an attempt to defend the the legacy of the prophet against an enemy that 
targets the legitimacy of Hizbullah to uphold the tradition the latter strived to cultivate for 
the past two decades. Sunni radical militant organizations share ideological affinities with 
Wahhabism and other Salafi movement that disseminate anti-Shi‘i sentiments. 
In 2013, Nasrallah proclaimed on the 9th day, “Tomorrow on the 10th day, it will be different 
from all previous years, because we are going out (khurūj) on Ashura in a completely 
different situation”. And on the tenth day, Nasrallah for the first time in years of 
confinement behind a TV screen, made a public appearance in the middle of Dahyeh to 
“renew our bay’a, our vow of allegiance, to Sayyid al mujāhidīn, Abi Abdellāh al Husayn”. 
The intensity of the crowd reached a paroxysm because of the physical presence of their 
long absent leader and in subsequent years, Nasrallah only appeared in public during the 
last two Ashura speeches he gave. 
 
While in Ashura in 2013, the mawqef was announced in a cooperative way that “the takfiri 
problem is one for all Muslisms, it targets everyone, Muslims and Christian and other, 
irrespective of creed, as long as one disagrees with them, but if we cooperate we can solve 
this problem”. In 2015, in a dithyrambic speech on the ninth day, Nasrallah differentiated 
between haq (right) and bātel (wrong), by pointing to US foreign policy in the Middle East as 
the source of all problems, driving Saudi Arabia in an all out confrontation with Iran, and as 
the main ideological repository of Salafi thinking which leads certain individuals to join these 
radical militant groups such as ISIS and Jubhat al Nusra. On the tenth day, after a harsh 
condemnation of Saudi politics in Yemen and in Syria, again punctuated by references to 
Husayn’s legacy in Karbala, and in completely unprecedented fashion, a group of people 
standing towards the front of the podium from where Nasrallah was giving his speech, gave 
their pledge of allegiance, to Nasrallah and to Khamenei (a practice that so far has been 
done during military practice): 
 
Send your blessings to Mohammad and the family of Muhammad, O' Sayyed son of 
Al Husayn, we are the Sons of Khomeini, and we have pledged our allegiance to Ali 
Khamenei, O' Sayyed Son of Muhammad, these shrouds stand as witness 
We wear the shrouds of sacrifice for Ali Khamenei, we are the defenders of Lady 
                                                     
29 I have explored in detail Hizbullah’s outlook on “the other” in Hizbullah’s Politics of Remembrance. 
Zainab. We will only see the beauty of God's acts, a promise from the god of the 
heavens to Ali Khamenei, this is the complete story, we are the devoted adherents of 
al-wilāya, And we conclude with a prayer for Ali Khamenei, God is Great, we reject 
humiliation.”  
 
The rise of this new enemy changes the performative role of identity and redraws the type 
of religio-political dynamics at play. If as Aurelie Daher would say “Hizbullah’s Islam” is 
subservient to the imperative of military resistance30, maybe one can add that it is military 
practices in its delineation of an enemy, in grouping people into a way of life and with the 
potential to mobilize for collective purposes that produce new forms of piety. It is also the 
case that most nationalisms led to such mobilization strategies whether in development, 
state formation or military formation. Instead of studying Hizbullah's Islam in light of 
nationalist movements, we need to reverse our attention to Hizbullah's legacy and what it 
does teach us about the “spiritual” nature of nationalism. We haven’t given sufficient 
attention to the way nationalism affects states of consciousness, consciousness as a living 
process that cannot be clearly separated into terms such as the “religious” or the “political”, 
separating reason from emotion, but also how such forms of belonging can shift in its 




                                                     
30 Aurélie Daher, Le Hezbollah : Mobilisation et pouvoir (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France - PUF, 
2014). 
